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Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human 
beings; their protection and promotion is the first responsibility of 
Governments.1
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The birth of a democratic state founded on the values of human rights and 
equality following the end of the apartheid system in 1994 necessitated a government 
that would be accountable, open, and responsive to the needs of the people of South 
Africa: a government that would ensure that the people of South Africa are able to 
live in peace and harmony, free from fear and want. This would not be easy, in view 
of the many decades of apartheid rule and its devastating impact on good governance. 
The inexperience of the African National Congress (ANC) in governing a country 
and the retention of apartheid civil servants, including the feared and brutal apartheid 
security forces, would be challenging as well.2
 These challenges necessitated the establishment of independent state institutions 
that would support the new government in the transformation of the apartheid state 
and help to strengthen constitutional democracy and the promotion and protection 
of human rights. In this regard, the 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa, 
which ushered in democratic governance in South Africa in 1994, established certain 
constitutional bodies to support the f ledgling democracy.3 These institutions are the 
Public Protector,4 the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC),5 and 
the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE).6 The Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) and the Auditor-General were already in existence and 
recognized by the Interim Constitution.7
 The 1996 Constitution, which replaced the Interim Constitution, retained these 
bodies, introduced a new institution, the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, and 
consolidated them under Chapter 9 of the Constitution.8 These six institutions are 
generally referred to as the Chapter 9 institutions.
1. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, § 1 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action].
2. The retention of apartheid civil servants was the result of a political settlement between the outgoing 
regime and the ANC. See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each Human Being: 
The United Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1464, 1531–32 (1996).
3. The 1993 Interim Constitution came into effect on April 27, 1994 to facilitate a new constitutional 
order. See John Dugard, International Law and the South African Constitution, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 77, 
77–78 (1997).
4. S. Afr. (Interim) Const., 1993, § 110.
5. Id. § 115.
6. Id. § 119.
7. See id. §§ 191, 124.
8. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181. 
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 The collective constitutional mandate of these institutions is to support and 
strengthen constitutional democracy in South Africa.9 The Constitution requires 
them to be independent, subject only to the Constitution and the law, and to carry 
out their responsibilities “without fear, favour or prejudice.”10 Organs of state,11 
however, have an obligation to “assist and protect these institutions to ensure [their] 
independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness.”12 Interference with the 
functioning of these institutions by any person or organ of state is prohibited by the 
Constitution.13 These institutions are accountable to the National Assembly of the 
South African Parliament and must report to the Assembly at least once a year 
regarding the discharge of their respective mandates.14
 The SAHRC, the country’s leading national institution for the promotion and 
protection of human rights, has the following constitutional functions: to “promote 
respect for human rights and a culture of human rights;” to “promote the protection, 
development and attainment of human rights;” and to “monitor and assess the 
observance of human rights in [South Africa].”15 The SAHRC also has power to 
“investigate and . . . report on the observance of human rights;” “secure appropriate 
redress where human rights have been violated;” conduct research on human rights 
issues; provide education and awareness on human rights; and request and receive 
information from organs of state on measures instituted to give effect to human rights, 
particularly to those pertaining to housing, education, and health care services.16
 The Public Protector, another key Chapter 9 institution, has a constitutional 
mandate to “investigate any conduct in state affairs . . . that is alleged or suspected to 
9. Id. (“The [Chapter 9 institutions] strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic.”).
10. Id. § 181(2).
11. An “organ of state” is defined as:
(a)  any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere 
of government; or 
(b) any other functionary or institution—
 (i)  exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a 
provincial constitution; or
 (ii)  exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial officer.
 Id. § 239.
12. Id. § 181(3).
13. Id. § 181(4).
14. Id. § 181(5).
15. Id. § 184(1). The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 provide additional functions for the South 
African Human Rights Commission.
16. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 184(2)–(3). The South African Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 
and its replacement, the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013, both provide 
additional powers for the SAHRC. These include the power to bring proceedings in any competent 
court in the Commission’s name or on behalf of any person or group in realization of its mandate. South 
African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 § 13(3)(b).
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be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice,” and to report on the 
findings of its investigations and take “appropriate remedial action” where there has 
been an improper use of public power.17
 International developments at the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) 
in 1993 had an impact on South Africa’s 1993 and 1996 constitutional provisions 
pertaining to the establishment and role of some of its constitutional bodies, 
particularly the SAHRC. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, recognized the 
importance of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, especially their role in addressing human rights violations and in the 
dissemination of information and education on human rights.18 In addition, it 
encouraged the establishment and strengthening of such institutions by states.19
 The UN General Assembly also adopted the Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (the “Paris Principles”) that set out the competence, 
responsibilities, composition, guarantees of independence, and methods of operation 
for these institutions.20 National human rights institutions (NHRIs) established in 
accordance with the Paris Principles were regarded as the latest addition in 
international, regional, and national human rights systems21 and were expected to be 
“an effective first port of call for victims of human rights violations.”22 These 
institutions were seen as bringing renewed energy, hope, and courage in the quest for 
universal respect for human rights. Kofi Annan, the then-UN Secretary-General, in 
acknowledging the role of these institutions, said “[b]uilding strong human rights 
institutions at the country level is what in the long run will ensure that human rights 
are protected and advanced in a sustained manner.”23
17. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 182(1). The mandate of the Public Protector does not, however, extend to the 
exercise of judicial authority. Id. § 182(3). The Public Protector Act 23 of 1994, the Executive Members’ 
Ethics Act 82 of 1998, and the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 afford 
additional functions to the Public Protector.
18. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 1, § I ¶ 36.
19. Id.
20. G.A. Res. 48/134, annex, Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (Dec. 20, 1993). 
According to these principles, NHRIs should have a broad legislative or constitutional mandate to 
promote and protect human rights, to be pluralistic in composition, and to be independent from 
government in terms of composition, methods of operation, and funding. Id.
21. See generally Richard Carver, A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and 
the Domestication of International Law, 10 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2010); C. Raj Kumar, National Human 
Rights Institutions and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Toward the Institutionalization and 
Developmentalization of Human Rights, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 755 (2006); Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic 
Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights 
Protection, 13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1, 2 (2000); Anne Smith, The Unique Position of National Human 
Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 904 (2006).
22. U.N. Secretary-General, National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶ 109, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/44 (Jan. 15, 2010).
23. U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change, ¶ 50, U.N. 
Doc. A/57/387 (Sept. 9, 2002).
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 Notwithstanding the role and importance of the Chapter 9 institutions in 
strengthening South Africa’s constitutional democracy, their challenges from the 
outset, especially those facing the Public Protector and the SAHRC, were manifold. 
How would those wielding political power in the country, including the government, 
its officials, political parties, and politicians, respond to scrutiny and intrusion by 
these unelected entities that could embarrass them and expose their failures and 
shortfalls? Would these institutions receive the necessary support from the 
government and other stakeholders to do their work effectively with no undue 
interference? Would there be attempts to undermine these institutions by appointing 
members that were too closely aligned with the ruling party to carry out their 
functions and exercise their powers effectively? Would those members who carry out 
their mandate impartially, without fear, favor, or prejudice, be constantly harassed 
and intimidated? Finally, would these institutions be able to deal with high levels of 
crime, corruption, unemployment, increasing inequalities between the rich and poor, 
and inadequate delivery of public services such as housing, roads, education, and 
health care services?
 The ANC, which was going to be the senior partner in the new government, did 
not have the practice and the culture of being accountable to outsiders and had not 
operated in a transparent manner in its armed struggle against the apartheid regime. 
The Chapter 9 institutions would also operate in a new government that consisted 
partly of former apartheid government officials who were not used to the type of 
scrutiny that these institutions exercise. Many of these former officials had reacted 
negatively, and sometimes even violently, against those pushing for transparency and 
accountability.24
 The passage of twenty years of democratic governance in South Africa provides 
a good opportunity to assess the progress Chapter 9 institutions have made. While 
this article mainly focuses on the Public Protector and the SAHRC, in light of their 
roles and their importance in South Africa’s constitutional democracy, other Chapter 
9 institutions, such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the 
Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), are also taken into account.
 Part II of this article examines the progress and achievements of the SAHRC 
and the Public Protector in the first two decades of South Africa’s democratic 
government through a general overview of their performance, followed by a specific 
assessment of each. Additionally, Part II examines the impact of changes in 
leadership in the two institutions in 2009. Part III reflects on the role of the state 
and the ruling party in supporting these institutions and in upholding their 
independence. It will look into the quality of leaders appointed to these institutions 
by exploring how they are exercising their powers and whether they are carrying out 
their functions effectively, impartially, and without fear, favor, or prejudice. This 
24. Many of those who opposed the system of apartheid, including human rights activists, were subjected to 
torture and other forms of cruel and degrading punishment, and others were assassinated. See 2 Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report 8, 11 (Oct. 29, 1998). See generally De 
Wet Potgieter, Total Onslaught: Apartheid’s Dirty Tricks Exposed (Ronel Richter-Herbert 
ed., Marléne Burger trans., 2007).
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section will also include experiences of other Chapter 9 institutions. Part IV discusses 
recommendations on how the Chapter 9 institutions could be made more effective in 
strengthening and supporting South Africa’s constitutional democracy in the next 
twenty years. Part V concludes the article.
ii.  prOgrEss and aChiEVEMEnts in thE first tWEntY YEars Of 
COnstitUtiOnaL dEMOCraCY
 A. General Overview 
 Over the past twenty years of democratic governance in South Africa, Chapter 9 
institutions have collectively played an important role in strengthening constitutional 
democracy. For example, the IEC has managed five national and provincial elections 
that have been declared free and fair25 and has received regional and international 
recognition for its many achievements.26 This has been a major accomplishment for a 
f ledgling democracy and has helped to put the country on a firm course of democratic 
governance. The Auditor-General, through its audit of state expenditure, has 
promoted better usage of public resources and enhanced the credibility of state bodies 
in cases where its negative audit findings and recommendations are acted upon and 
taken seriously.27
 The Public Protector and the SAHRC, both established in October 1995, have 
played key roles in entrenching a culture of respect for the rule of law and human 
rights and in helping to ensure that the state and its various bodies are indeed 
accountable, transparent, and responsive to the needs of the people. The Public 
Protector has helped to promote proper and effective use of public power and 
contributed to exposing and rooting out corruption in government,28 while the 
SAHRC has made an important contribution to the building of a new society based 
on human rights.29 The SAHRC’s work in the promotion of equality and prevention 
of unfair discrimination, and racism in particular, has been exemplary in this 
25. See South Africa - First 20 Years of Democracy (1994-2014), S. Afr. Hist. Online, http://www.sahistory.
org.za/article/south-africa-first-20-years-democracy-1994-2014 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
26. The IEC has won several national, regional, and international awards for its work. See Awards, 
Electoral Commission S. Afr., http://www.elections.org.za/content/about-us/awards/ (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2016).
27. E.g., Andisiwe Makinana, Parliament Showers Outgoing AG Nombembe with Praise, Mail & Guardian 
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-06-parliament-showers-outgoing-ag-nombembe-with-
praise.
28. For a list of the Public Protector’s published investigation reports on abuse of power and public resources, 
see Investigation Reports, Pub. Protector S. Afr., http://www.publicprotector.org/library/investigation_ 
report/investigation_report.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). In recognition of her contribution as the 
current Public Protector, Ms. Thulisile “Thuli” Madonsela has been awarded four honorary Doctor of 
Laws degrees by four South African universities since 2013. See Public Protector Thuli Madonsela Receives 
Fourth Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree, S. Afr. Gov’t (June 9, 2015), http://www.gov.za/speeches/
public-protector-get-her-fourth-honorary-doctor-laws-degree-9-jun-2015-0000.
29. See Yvonne Erasmus, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Critically Reflecting on an Institutional 
Journey 2002-2009, at 94–95, 104 (2009). 
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regard.30 The institution’s litigation, especially in the Constitutional Court, has 
made a significant contribution to entrenching the judicial enforcement and 
protection of economic and social rights.31
 These two bodies generally respond to the complaints they receive from the 
public in relation to abuse of power and the violation of human rights through 
investigations,32 public hearings,33 and, in the case of the SAHRC, litigation.34 The 
Public Protector and SAHRC’s responses to complaints have helped in building 
confidence in both the state and the rule of law. In the first decade of their 
establishment and operation, these two institutions each received, on average, over 
10,000 complaints per annum.35 In 2014, the Office of the Public Protector finalized 
24,642 cases out of 39,817 received,36 while the SAHRC finalized 8,550 cases out of 
9,217.37 Their reports in pursuit of their respective mandates and on relevant public 
policy issues, as well as their submissions on legislation,38 have helped to promote 
good governance and respect for human rights.
30. The SAHRC has produced numerous reports over the years on the realization of economic and social 
rights in South Africa in line with section 184(3) of the Constitution and has held several public 
hearings on these rights. See S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Report on Economic and Social Rights 
9, 57 (2012–2013).
31. Erasmus, supra note 29, at 59; S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Equality Roundtable Dialogue 
Report 10 (2014) [hereinafter SAHRC Equality Roundtable Report]; see also Bhe v. Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
32. See generally supra notes 28, 30 and accompanying text.
33. The SAHRC has held over nineteen public hearings on human rights issues, ranging from poverty to 
acts of racism. See Hearing Reports, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.
php?ipkContentID=15&ipkMenuID=19 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); see also Erasmus, supra note 29, at 
104. The Public Protector holds an annual National Stakeholder Consultative Dialogue in the Western 
Cape that covers healthcare issues and poverty. Media Release, Pub. Protector S. Afr., Public Protector 
Launches Annual National Stakeholder Consultative Dialogue (June 20, 2013), http://www.pprotect.
org/media_gallery/2013/20062013.asp.
34. See supra note 31.
35. Parliament of the Republic of S. Afr., Report of the ad hoc Committee on the Review of 
Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions 99, 179 (2007) [hereinafter ad hoc Committee Report].
36. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2013/14, at 57 (2014).
37. S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Annual Report 18 (2014) [hereinafter SAHRC Annual Report 
2014].
38. The SAHRC played a major role in the drafting of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. The Commission hosted a unit that produced the draft bill before it was 
handed over to the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development for processing and tabling in 
Parliament. See S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Bill, 1999, at 1–2 (Nov. 23, 1999). The Commission has made over forty 
written submissions on draft laws in Parliament since 1999. See Submission on Legislation, S. Afr. Hum. 
Rts. Comm’n, http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkContentID=19&ipkMenuID=26 (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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 B. General Performance into the Early Second Decade 
 The role and contribution of Chapter 9 institutions in the first decade of South 
Africa’s democracy were recognized by the ad hoc Committee on the Review of 
Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions (the “Committee”), established by the National 
Assembly in 2006.39 The Committee focused on four areas in which these institutions 
were meant to make a significant impact in the context of their mandate to support 
and strengthen constitutional democracy in South Africa: (1) the restoration of the 
credibility of the state and its institutions; (2) the f lourishing of democracy and 
human rights values and norms; (3) respect for the rule of law; and (4) the 
establishment of a state that is “more open and responsive to the needs of its citizens 
and more respectful of their rights.”40
 In relation to the performance of the SAHRC, the Committee made the 
following observations and findings in its report: 
Over the past decade, the [SAHRC] has built up a reputation amongst 
human rights activists and members of the public as an active and passionate 
defender of human rights. With limited financial and human resources, the 
[SAHRC] has made a real difference to the promotion and protection of 
human rights in the areas it focused on. At the same time, the [SAHRC] has 
managed to retain civil relationships with the Legislature and Executive, and 
has worked with relevant individuals and institutions in the other branches of 
government when this was required. . . . The [SAHRC] has also developed 
an international reputation as an independent institution for the promotion 
and protection of human rights and assists human rights commissions 
elsewhere in Africa with capacity building.41
In its concluding remarks on the role of the SAHRC, the Committee noted: 
It appears to the Committee that the [SAHRC] more than adequately 
satisfies requirements as identified in the Committee’s terms of reference 
with regard to professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness. The Committee 
believes that the work done by the [SAHRC] is of vital relevance for South 
Africa and makes an important contribution to the deepening of democracy 
and the achievement of a human rights culture in this country.42
The Committee was not so kind on the performance of the Public Protector. Though 
the Committee did not place the entire fault on the Public Protector, in relation to its 
usage of statutory power, the Committee made the following observation: “The Public 
Protector has extensive powers to demand public information but has only had to 
resort to subpoenas on two occasions to obtain the necessary information. Nevertheless, 
the Committee notes that investigations are often delayed by the failure of departments 
39. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at ix.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 172.
42. Id. at 184.
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or public entities to co-operate in a timely fashion.”43 The Committee was also 
unhappy with the Public Protector’s lack of proactivity.44 Despite having statutory 
powers to conduct self-initiated investigations; the Public Protector had initiated only 
ten cases in 2006–2007.45 The Committee noted that “[i]n cases where a matter is one 
of great public importance, the public would expect the Public Protector to act.” 46
 Internal governance and leadership challenges due to public disputes between the 
Public Protector and the Deputy Public Protector47 were of concern to the 
Committee.48 The Committee was of the view that such disagreements “tarnish the 
image of the office and undermine its credibility.”49 Additionally, the Committee 
found that “the public is not aware of the Public Protector, despite its outreach 
activities and the establishment of provincial and regional offices.”50 This lack of 
public awareness was attributed to a “weak . . . informal and intermittent” relationship 
between civil society and the Public Protector.51 In a 2007 survey of public perceptions 
conducted on behalf of the Committee, the SAHRC performed much better than 
the Public Protector in terms of public awareness, importance, and effectiveness.52
 C. Beyond the Committee Review: Performance Under New Leadership
 The change of leadership and management in the SAHRC and the Public 
Protector in 2009 resulted in a marked role reversal in the quality of each institution’s 
performance and the public’s perception of its credibility. In 2009, the leader of the 
Public Protector53 since 2002, Lawrence Mushwana, a former Member of Parliament, 
was appointed as the new Chairperson of the SAHRC on behalf of the ruling party, 
the ANC,54 while Thulisile “Thuli” Madonsela, one of the drafters of the Constitution, 
43. Id. at 98. 
44. See id. at 100.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 was amended by the Public Protector Amendment Act 22 of 2003 
to introduce the post of a Deputy Public Protector who exercises powers delegated to him or her by the 
Public Protector.
48. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 104. 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 101.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Id. at 258–59. According to the survey, 65% of the public was aware of the SAHRC while 42% was 
aware of the Public Protector. Id. at 259. In addition, 62% regarded the SAHRC as important, while 
only 40% saw the Public Protector as important. Id. at 261. Forty-four per cent felt that the SAHRC 
was effective, while only 27% felt the Public Protector was effective. Id. at 262.
53. The term “Public Protector” is used to refer to the Office of the Public Protector as well as the leader of 
the institution.
54. Mabedle Lawrence Mushwana, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.
php?ipkContentID=46 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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became the new Public Protector.55 Since 2009, the Public Protector has taken up 
investigations into more high-profile matters pertaining to the abuse of power and 
public resources by the country’s President,56 high-ranking government officials,57 and 
even members of other Chapter 9 institutions.58
 The Public Protector’s findings have led to the dismissal of a few Cabinet 
ministers59 and the Chief of the South African Police Service,60 as well as the 
resignation of the Chairperson of the IEC.61 The Public Protector’s investigations 
into abuse of power and improper use of public resources have also benefitted 
ordinary people by helping to promote and protect their human rights. For example, 
the Public Protector has addressed complaints by those who were unreasonably 
denied basic government services such as access to social grants62 and those whose 
children were wrongfully denied access to schoolbooks.63
55. Profile of Advocate Thulisile (Thuli) Madonsela: Public Protector-RSA, Pub. Protector S. Afr., http://
www.pprotect.org/about_us/profile_public_protector.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
56. See Pub. Protector S. Afr., Secure in Comfort: Report on an Investigation into Allegations 
of Impropriety and Unethical Conduct Relating to the Installation and Implementation 
of Security Measures by the Department of Public Works at and in Respect of the Private 
Residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla in the KwaZulu-Natal Province: Report 
No. 25 of 2013/14 (2014) [hereinafter Secure in Comfort].
57. See Pub. Protector S. Afr., The Cost of Travel: A Report on an Investigation into 
Allegations of a Violation of the Executive Ethics Code and the Constitution by the 
Minister and Deputy Minister of Sport and Recreation, the Hon. Fikile Mbalula, MP and 
Gerhardus Oosthuizen, MP: Report No. 18 of 2014/15 (2015).
58. See Pub. Protector S. Afr., Unsettled Business: Report on an Investigation into 
Allegations that the Commission for Gender Equality Unfairly Excluded its Former 
Chief Executive Officer When they Paid Arrear Contributions to the Provident Fund to 
Middle and Senior Management Service Employees, and to Pay her Cellular Telephone 
Benefits for the Period she was on Precautionary Suspension: Report No. 13 of 2014/2015 
(2015) [hereinafter Unsettled Business].
59. South Africa’s Jacob Zuma Fires Top Ministers, BBC News (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-15434529.
60. South Africa Police Chief Bheki Cele Fired by Jacob Zuma, BBC News (June 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-18414786.
61. In 2014, Pansy Tlakula resigned as IEC Chairperson after Public Protector Madonsela found Tlakula 
“committed gross maladministration” in the procurement of a lease for a new headquarters for the IEC. 
Tlakula and IEC Committee Guilty of Gross Maladministration, SABC News (Aug. 26, 2013), www.sabc.
co.za/news/a/2a78fc8040dd8ae49ebfbf434f2981a1/Tlakula-and-IEC-committee-guilty-of--gross-
maladministration--20130826; see also Verashni Pillay, IEC Chair Pansy Tlakula Resigns, Mail & 
Guardian (Sept. 2, 2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-09-02-iec-chair-pansy-tlakula-resigns.
62. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Accountability: Report on an Investigation into Allegations of 
Undue Delay by the South African Social Security Agency in Implementing the Decisions 
of the Independent Tribunal for Social Assistance Appeals: Report No. 6 of 2014/15 (2014). 
63. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Learning Without Books: Report on an Investigation into Alleged 
Shortages and Incorrect Supply of School Workbooks by the National Department of 
Basic Education to Eastern Cape Schools: Report No. 19 of 2013/14 (2013).
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 In the financial year 2010–2011, the Public Protector received 16,251 complaints 
from the public about maladministration and settled 14,148 of those complaints.64 
One of the complaints was against a fellow Chapter 9 institution, the CGE.65 The 
Public Protector found that the CGE had acted unlawfully and irregularly in the 
appointment of two of its commissioners as joint Chief Executive Officers in violation 
of the CGE’s enabling legislation.66
 This display of courage and fierce independence in the leadership of the Public 
Protector following Madonsela’s appointment has catapulted the institution far above 
the SAHRC as a leading champion of constitutional democracy in the second decade 
of South Africa’s democracy. As a result, Madonsela and the Office of the Public 
Protector have become darlings of national and international media, fellow national 
and international human rights bodies, and the South African public in general.67
 Despite being overshadowed by the Public Protector in the second decade of 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the SAHRC continues to carry out its 
constitutional mandate of promoting and protecting human rights by investigating 
human rights violations, holding public hearings, litigating on human rights issues, 
and organizing national and international human rights workshops and conferences.68 
 The SAHRC has also maintained its involvement in regional and international 
activities of NHRIs and in relevant activities of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, various bodies of the UN, and the UN Human Rights Council 
in particular.69 The SAHRC has managed to retain its status as a NHRI that 
64. Pub. Protector S. Afr., Annual Report 2010/2011, at 7 (2011) [hereinafter Pub. Protector 
Annual Report 2010/2011].
65. See Pub. Protector S. Afr., A Constitutional Institution in Need of Good Governance: 
Report on an Investigation into Complaints Relating to Misconduct and Maladministration 
in Connection with the Affairs of the Commission for Gender Equality: Report No. 22 of 
2010/11 (2010) [hereinafter A Constitutional Institution in Need of Good Governance].
66. See Pub. Protector Annual Report 2010/2011, supra note 64, at 15. See generally A Constitutional 
Institution in Need of Good Governance, supra note 65.
67. In 2014, Madonsela was named one of the most inf luential people in the world by Time for her work as 
Public Protector. Lamido Sanusi, Thuli Madonsela, Time (Apr. 23, 2014), http://time.com/70854/thuli-
madonsela-2014-time-100/. Madonsela was also declared the winner of the global Integrity Award by 
Transparency International for her courage and determination in the fight against corruption. Thuli 
Madonsela – Integrity Award Winner 2014, Transparency Int’l (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.
transparency.org/news/feature/thuli_madonsela_integrity_award_winner_2014. In addition, 
Madonsela and the Office of the Public Protector received the Newsmaker of the Year award two years 
in a row by the Johannesburg Press Club. The annual award considers the amount of news generated by 
a nominee, the manner in which a nominee generates news, and “to what extent the country benefit[s] 
from such news.” Media Release, Pub. Relations Inst. S. Afr., Newsmaker of the Year (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://www.prisa.co.za/news-and-media-center/mediareleases/37-mediareleases/498-newsmaker-of-
the-year.
68. For example, in 2013–2014, the SAHRC resolved 8,550 human rights violation cases. SAHRC Annual 
Report 2014, supra note 37, at 29.
69. For more information on the SAHRC’s recent involvement and participation in various regional and 
international activities, see S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Annual Report (2013) [hereinafter SAHRC 
Annual Report 2013].
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complies with the Paris Principles pertaining to its independence and functions as 
determined by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (the “Sub-Committee”) of the 
International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights (ICC).70 This determination grants the SAHRC 
observer status with full speaking rights on all agenda items in meetings of the UN 
Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly.71
 As a result of its regional and international work the SAHRC was elected to 
chair the Network of African National Human Rights Institutions based in Nairobi, 
Kenya, from 2011 to 2013.72 The SAHRC currently chairs the ICC.73 In 2012, the 
institution received an award for its work on the African continent at the 25th 
Anniversary awards ceremony of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, held in Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire, during the 52nd Ordinary Session of 
the African Commission.74
 D. General Challenges in the First Twenty Years of Constitutional Democracy
 While the SAHRC, the Public Protector, the IEC, and the Auditor-General 
have consistently performed well in the first twenty years of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy, the other Chapter 9 institutions, the CGE and the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious 
and Linguistic Communities, have generally not discharged their mandates75 in a 
70. See Int’l Coordinating Comm. of Nat’l Insts. for the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, 
Report and Recommendations of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) 
(2012). This helped the SAHRC in getting elected to chair the ICC for 2013–2014 and become the first 
African NHRI to hold such position. See South African Human Rights Commission Voted as New ICC Chair, 
Commonwealth F. Nat’l Hum. Rts. Institutions (Nov. 28, 2012), http://cfnhri.org/south-african-
human-rights-commission-voted-as-new-icc-chair/. As of January 2014, the SAHRC has maintained 
compliance with the Paris Principles. See Chart of the Status of National Institutions: Accreditation Status as of 
28 January 2014, Int’l Coordinating Comm. of Nat’l Insts. for the Promotion and Prot. of 
Human Rights (ICC), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/NHRI/Chart_Status_NIs.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
71. See ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), Int’l Coordinating Comm. of Nat’l Insts. for the 
Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights (ICC), http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2016); see also Commission on Human Rights Res. 2005/74 (Apr. 
20, 2005); Human Rights Council Res. 20/L.15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.15 (June 29, 2012).
72. See Media Statement, Isaac Mangena, Spokesperson, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, SAHRC to Become 
Chair of International Human Rights Body (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.
php?ipkArticleID=149; see also Nanhri Gets a New Chairperson, Network Natl. Hum. Rts. 
Institutions, http://www.nanhri.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=139:nanhri-
gets-a-new-chairperson&catid=86&Itemid=628&lang=en (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74. See SAHRC Receives African Commission Award for its Commitment to the Realisation of Human Rights, S. 
Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkArticleID=139. 
The SAHRC was the runner up to the Uganda Human Rights Commission. UHRC Wins an Award, 
Uganda Hum. Rts. Comm’n, http://www.uhrc.ug/uhrc-wins-award (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
75. See generally S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 185, 187.
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satisfactory manner. Lamenting the poor performance of the CGE in the first decade 
of South Africa’s democracy, the Committee said: 
The Committee finds that it must report on the Commission in pain and 
sorrow, rather than in anger. As such, it strongly believes that the Commission 
represents a lost opportunity as until now it has failed to engage in a sustained 
and effective manner with the policies, approaches and mechanisms to 
eliminate all forms of gender discrimination and to promote gender issues in 
South Africa. 76
 The Committee highlighted several internal and external factors that affected the 
CGE’s ability to give effect to its constitutional mandate as a Chapter 9 institution.77 
The internal factors included inadequate understanding and appreciation of the 
CGE’s constitutional mandate by its members; poor leadership; lack of independence 
characterized by the unwillingness of CGE members to take a public stand on issues 
that might embarrass government; internal divisions and tensions; poor relations with 
external stakeholders and civil society in particular; and inefficient usage of limited 
resources.78 The external factors included inadequate support by the state, which 
includes inadequate funding; poor responses to findings and recommendations; 
outdated legislation; and inadequate oversight by Parliament and its respective 
committees manifested by minimal engagement with reports and findings of the 
CGE.79 In response to the challenges that faced the CGE in the first decade, the 
Committee regretfully concluded that these factors had undermined the CGE’s 
efficiency and effectiveness, ultimately bringing its relevance into question.80 As a 
result, the Committee recommended that the CGE be merged with the SAHRC.81
 The challenges identified by the Committee after the first decade have, 
unfortunately, continued to affect the CGE in the second decade, as the Commission 
remains as ineffective, inefficient, and invisible in the second decade as it was in the 
first decade.82 These internal and external shortcomings apply to the other Chapter 9 
institutions in varying degrees. The next section reviews the effect of some of these 
factors, particularly with respect to the Public Protector and the SAHRC.
76. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 150.
77. Id. at 150–62.
78. Id. 
79. Id. The Human Rights Watch, in its report on the role of African Human Rights Commissions and 
their effectiveness in promoting and protecting human rights, made similar findings. See Human 
Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders?: Government Human Rights Commissions in 
Africa 4–5 (2001).
80. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 162.
81. Id. at 164.
82. The Committee indicated that only about thirty-four per cent of those surveyed in 2002 knew about the 
Commission. Id. at 155. Not much has changed today, as the CGE remains invisible in the media (both 
electronic and print). According to its 2013–2014 annual report, the CGE received only 894 complaints. 
Comm’n for Gender Equal., Annual Report 2013/2014, at 49 (2014). 
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iii.  thE VaLUE Of LEadErship and thE rOLE Of thE statE and thE rULing 
partY in sUppOrting thE ChaptEr 9 institUtiOns
 A. The Importance of Quality Leadership 
 On the importance of good leadership in Chapter 9 institutions, the Committee 
said “the establishment and entrenchment of a vibrant human rights culture requires 
strong leadership from a legitimate, independent and authoritative body.” 83 The 
commendable performance of the SAHRC prior to 2009, and that of the Public 
Protector thereafter, provide examples of the impact good leadership can have on the 
performance of Chapter 9 institutions. On the other hand, bad and poor leadership, 
as displayed by the CGE, has had an adverse effect on its performance and standing 
in the public.84
 Leadership challenges played a key role in poor performance by the Public 
Protector in the first decade. One example of these challenges is the discord between 
the then-Public Protector, Lawrence Mushwana, and his Deputy in 2006,85 which, 
according to the Committee, “tarnish[ed] the image of the [Public Protector].”86 
This discord entailed allegations made by the Deputy Public Protector against the 
Public Protector of sexual harassment and an autocratic style of management.87
 Another example can be seen in Mushwana’s narrow interpretation of his 
mandate as the Public Protector in relation to high-profile matters in the first decade, 
which gave the impression that he did not want to make adverse findings against 
high-ranking government officials and the ruling party, the ANC.88 This narrow 
interpretation resulted in the Public Protector declining to investigate abuses of 
public funds by individuals close to the ANC, on the f limsy ground that the mandate 
did not extend to non-state entities, even though public funds were involved. 
 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in Public Protector v. Mail & Guardian, challenged 
this narrow interpretation.89 In this case, Imvume Management, a private company 
83. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 167.
84. An example in this regard is the dispute between the CGE and its former Chief Executive Officer over 
the non-payment of her cellular phone charges for official calls during the period between May 2008 
and November 2009, when she was on precautionary suspension from work. The matter ended up with 
the Public Protector in October 2010. The Public Protector made a finding against the CGE and 
requested that the former Chief Executive Officer be paid back with interest. See Unsettled Business, 
supra note 58, at 26–28.
85. See Mmanaledi Mataboge, Shock R7m Payout for Mushwana, Mail & Guardian (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-10-30-shock-r7m-payout-for-mushwana. 
86. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 104.
87. Mushwana’s Deputy, Mamiki Shai, threatened to sue him in 2006 for harassment, emotional torture, 
and defamation of character. Wendy Jasson da Costa, Public Protector Stand-off Set to Go to Court, IOL 
News (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/public-protector-stand-off-set-to-go-to-
court-1.288361.
88. See Mataboge, supra note 85. The Committee also complained about this conduct. See ad hoc 
Committee Report, supra note 35, at 98.
89. 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at paras. 3, 92–93.
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with close links to the ANC, had obtained ZAR15 million90 as an advance for a 
transaction from a state oil company, PetroSA.91 Imvume Management then 
transferred ZAR11 million to the ANC and could not pay back the money to the 
state company.92 This matter was subsequently brought to the Public Protector to 
investigate improper conduct and maladministration on the part of PetroSA and 
Imvume Management.93 The Public Protector, Mushwana, found no merit in the 
matter because Imvume Management and the ANC, according to him, were not 
public bodies and therefore did not fall under his jurisdiction, and further because 
the state funds ceased to be public funds once they passed into the hands of private 
entities.94 The Court in this matter held:
The office of the Public Protector is an important institution. It provides 
what will often be a last defence against bureaucratic oppression, and against 
corruption and malfeasance in public office that is capable of insidiously 
destroying the nation. If that institution falters, or finds itself undermined, 
the nation loses an indispensable constitutional guarantee. 95
The Court further said: 
The office of the Public Protector is declared by the Constitution to be one 
that is independent and impartial, and the Constitution demands that its 
powers must be exercised “without fear, favour or prejudice.” Those words are 
not mere material for rhetoric, as words of that kind are often used. The 
words mean what they say. Fulfilling their demands will call for courage at 
times, but it will always call for vigilance and conviction of purpose.96
 While there are many factors that have caused the decline in the SAHRC’s 
performance and visibility in the second decade of South Africa’s democracy, the 
impact of the appointment of the former Public Protector Mushwana as the 
Chairperson of the SAHRC in 2009 cannot be discounted.97
90. ZAR refers to Rand, South Africa’s currency.
91. Mail & Guardian, 2011 (4) SA 420 at paras. 33–34, 37, 42.
92. Id. at paras. 47, 49. 
93. Id. at paras. 50, 76, 86.
94. Id. at paras. 92–93.
95. Id. at para. 6. The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected Mushwana’s decision as artificial and baseless in 
law. See id. at paras. 116, 123, 134, 139–41.
96. Id. at para. 8 (quoting S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(2)).
97. An analysis of the SAHRC’s annual report shows that there was a decline in the number of human 
rights complaints the Commission received after the appointment of Mushwana and new commissioners 
at the end of 2009. This is a good indication of public perception, awareness, and confidence in a body 
like the SAHRC. In 2008–2009, the Commission received 8,556 complaints. S. Afr. Hum. Rts. 
Comm’n, Annual Report 20 (2009). These increased to 9,326 in 2009–2010, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. 
Comm’n, Annual Report 27 (2010), and drastically declined to 5,626 in 2010–2011, S. Afr. Hum. 
Rts. Comm’n, Annual Report 22 (2011), increasing slightly to 5,784 in 2011–2012, S. Afr. Hum. 
Rts. Comm’n, Annual Report 7 (2012).
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 Several scholars and commentators were critical of Mushwana as the Public 
Protector and expressed concern that his appointment as the Chairperson of the 
SAHRC would turn the SAHRC into a “toothless tiger.”98 Another commentator, 
Barney Mthombothi, said that the ANC had undermined these institutions by 
“packing them with toadies to do its bidding,” and that Mushwana, “after the 
wrecking job he did as public protector, has been rewarded with deployment to the 
[SAHRC], where he seems to be succeeding in emasculating it.”99
 Songezo Zibi, the editor of Business Day,100 also questioned the motive of the ANC 
in appointing Mushwana as the Chairperson of the SAHRC in view of his performance 
in his previous position as the Public Protector. In his recent book, Zibi says:
What we now know is that the ANC has long abandoned any pretensions of 
wanting to give full meaning to the spirit of South Africa’s Constitution as it 
relates to the separation of powers and the fundamental democratic principle 
of separating the party from the state. In addition to the appointment of 
extremely dubious characters to the [National Prosecuting Authority], the 
2002 appointment of the ethically moribund Lawrence Mushwana as public 
protector and later the [Chairperson of the SAHRC] in 2009, there is the 
new and constant public harassment of Advocate Thuli Madonsela, public 
protector since 2009. 101
On the importance of appointing suitable persons to independent state institutions in 
order to enhance their effectiveness and the challenges in appointing ANC loyalists 
to these institutions, he wrote: 
It is in this area that the policy of cadre deployment has a degenerative effect 
on the country’s young democratic culture and erodes the rights of citizens. 
There have been examples in the past, such as the former public protector, 
Lawrence Mushwana, a former ANC MP, being compelled by the high court 
to properly investigate the Oilgate Scandal. He left office before he could do 
so but he is easily the most perfect example of a party sycophant neglecting 
his constitutional obligations in order to cover up corruption in his political 
party, to which he clearly had more allegiance.102
98. E.g., Pierre de Vos, R.I.P. Human Rights Commission?, Constitutionally Speaking (Aug. 25, 2009), 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/rip-human-rights-commission/.
99. Barney Mthombothi, Watchdogs Lose Bite as Tlakula Gets a Sabbatical at Taxpayers’ Expense, Sunday 
Times (July 6, 2014), http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/2014/07/06/watchdogs-lose-bite-as-
tlakula-gets-a-sabbatical-at-taxpayers-expense. Mthombothi further wrote: “These bodies were meant 
to guard against the abuse of power, but some of them have been used as tools by those in power.” Id.; 
see also Catherine Musuva, Promoting the Effectiveness of Democracy Protection 
Institutions in Southern Africa: South Africa’s Public Protector and Human Rights 
Commission 39 (2009) (“[T]he Public Protector’s apparent deference to the executive and, as a corollary, 
the ruling party, displayed in his reluctance to investigate fully high-profile cases implicating politicians, 
and the narrow interpretation of his mandate undermine constitutional democracy by protecting the few 
and not the many.”).
100. Business Day is a daily newspaper in South Africa.
101. Songezo Zibi, Raising the Bar: Hope & Renewal in South Africa 170 (Alison Lowry ed. 2014).
102. Id. at 132.
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 Lawrence Mushwana cannot be held completely accountable for the quality of 
the SAHRC’s performance. There are seven other members who can vote against 
him in any decisionmaking process.103 However, the public and media perceptions 
around him cannot be discounted, whether fair or otherwise, and seem to have 
followed him to the SAHRC.
 The recent resignation of the Chairperson of the IEC, Pansy Tlakula, over the 
Public Protector’s finding of irregular and unlawful use of public funds is another 
example of the impact of leadership in these institutions.104 This resignation and 
surrounding circumstances affected the image of a Chapter 9 institution that has done 
very well in the execution of its mandate. The IEC has received local, national, and 
international accolades for managing the country’s elections since 1994 and for assisting 
other countries in conducting their elections.105 In United Democratic Movement v. 
Tlakula, the Electoral Court held that “the respondent [Pansy Tlakula] compromised 
the independence and integrity of the Commission to such an extent that her actions 
complained of constitute misconduct . . . which renders her unsuitable for the office of 
a commissioner and [is] destructive of the very values of the Commission.”106
 B. Undermining the Independence of Chapter 9 Institutions
 Another major challenge that these institutions have faced in the first decade, and 
continue to face in the second decade, is the undermining of their independence by 
the state and the ruling party. This challenge is seen in the appointment of members 
that are too close or closely aligned with the ruling party and who generally fail to 
carry out their mandate impartially, as required by the Constitution. The appointment 
of Mushwana as the Public Protector, and later as the Chairperson of the SAHRC, is 
103. According to section 5 of the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013, the 
Commission should consist of eight commissioners appointed by the President, at least six of whom 
should be appointed on a full-term basis. Section 7 further provides that the Chairperson of the 
Commission is accountable to his fellow commissioners for the exercise of his powers and functions on 
behalf of the Commission, and section 10(4) provides that “[t]he decision of the majority of the 
commissioners . . . is the decision of the Commission.” South African Human Rights Commission Act 
40 of 2013 §§ 5(1)–(2), 7(3), 10(4). Therefore, whatever the Chairperson of the Commission does or 
does not do is with the consent and support of the majority of his fellow commissioners.
104. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. In the Public Protector’s report Inappropriate Moves from 
August 2013, the Chairperson of the IEC was found to have f louted tender procedures in securing the 
lease of new premises and furniture for the institution for an amount over ZAR130.8 million, and did 
not disclose a conf lict of interest in that her friend was a shareholder in the leased property. This 
conduct, according to the Public Protector’s finding, had the impact of undermining public confidence 
in the IEC. See Pub. Protector S. Afr., Inappropriate Moves: Report on an Investigation 
into Allegations of Maladministration and Corruption in the Procurement of the 
Riverside Office Park to Accommodate the Head Offices of the Electoral Commission: 
Report No. 13 of 2013/2014, at 207–18 (2013).
105. See Awards, Electoral Commission S. Afr., http://www.Elections.Org.Za/Content/About-Us/
Awards/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
106. 2015 (5) BCLR 597 (Elect Ct) at para. 159.
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an example of this phenomenon.107 Mushwana, in his time as Public Protector, was 
criticized as “succeeding only in protecting the ANC from the people instead of 
protecting the people.”108
 Members of Chapter 9 institutions that become too independent face major 
criticism and are sometimes subjected to undue political pressure, intimidation, and 
even insults by some members and supporters of the ruling party.109 The hostility 
directed at the current Public Protector Thuli Madonsela, in response to her findings 
against the country’s President, Jacob Zuma, for public funds used to beef up security 
at his private home in Nkandla and against other high-ranking officials, probably 
represents the biggest threat to the role and independence of Chapter 9 institutions 
today.110 The contempt and outright insults directed at Madonsela constitute the 
worst form of attacks that any Chapter 9 institution has received in the last twenty 
years of South Africa’s constitutional democracy and do not augur well for the future. 
Madonsela has been referred to as a “CIA agent” by a Deputy Minister of Defence111 
and “ugly” by the Congress of South African Students.112 Government officials have 
also accused Madonsela of “acting as . . . if [she] were God”113 and being a member 
and supporter of opposition parties in Parliament.114 There have also been calls for 
her dismissal by supporters of the ruling party. 115 Of these attacks on the Public 
Protector, Songezo Zibi concluded: 
It has now become the ANC’s unstated task to attempt to discredit Advocate 
Madonsela at every turn in order to undermine the high confidence she 
107. See Mataboge, supra note 85.
108. Id. 
109. See Criticise Thuli, Don’t Insult Her, Mail & Guardian: Editorials (Sept. 12, 2014), http://mg.co.za/
article/2014-09-11-editorial-criticise-thuli-dont-insult-her; Mandonsela ‘Feared for Her Life’ During 
Nkandla Investigation, Mail & Guardian (Mar. 23, 2014), http://mg.co.za/article/2014-03-23-
madonsela-feared-for-her-life-during-nkandla-investigation.
110. See supra note 109. For more information on the Public Protector’s findings surrounding Nkandla, see 
Secure in Comfort, supra note 56.
111. Baldwin Ndaba, Thuli a CIA Spy, Says Deputy Minister, IOL News (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.iol.
co.za/news/politics/thuli-a-cia-spy-says-deputy-minister-1.1747300#.VFBWBRb55-Q. 
112. See ANCYL, COSAS Summoned Over Thuli Madonsela Comments, News24: City Press (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/ancyl-cosas-summoned-thuli-madonsela-comments/.
113. Alexis Okeowo, Can Thulisile Madonsela Save South Africa from Itself?, N.Y. Times Mag. (June 16, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/magazine/can-thulisile-madonsela-save-south-africa-
from-itself.html?_r=0.
114. Bongani Hans & Siyabonga Mkhwanazi, Nkandla: Thuli Blasts Nhleko’s Report, IOL News (Aug. 3, 
2015), http://beta.iol.co.za/news/politics/nkandla-thuli-blasts-nhlekos-report-1894214; Jan-Jan Joubert 
& Bianca Capazorio, Madonsela Feels Hostility of ANC MPs, Bus. Day (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.
bdlive.co.za/national/2015/04/30/madonsela-feels-hostility-of-anc-mps.
115. The National Executive Committee of the Police and Prison Civil Rights Union, an ally of the ANC, 
called for the dismissal of Madonsela in 2014 for her finding against the President of the country and of 
the ANC, Jacob Zuma. See Nkosinathi Theledi, Thuli Madonsela Should be Dismissed - POPCRU, Pol. 
Web (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=74
6373&sn=Marketingweb+detail.
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enjoys in the public arising out of her attempts to fight the corruption and 
maladministration referred to her office. The project to undermine her 
shifted into high gear after President Zuma came under the spotlight over 
Nkandla, the construction of his palatial private residence using about  
[ZA]R246m of taxpayers’ money.116
 These attacks show a lack of respect for Chapter 9 institutions and an increasing 
hostility toward attempts to hold the government and those in power accountable. In 
so doing, they ignore what the Supreme Court of Appeal said in the Public Protector 
v. Mail & Guardian: 
The Constitution upon which the nation is founded is a grave and solemn 
promise to all its citizens. It includes a promise of representative and 
accountable government functioning within the framework of pockets of 
independence that are provided by various independent institutions. One of 
those independent institutions is the office of the Public Protector.117
Intimidating the Public Protector, the SAHRC, and any other Chapter 9 institution 
threatens the promise of representative and accountable government necessary for 
the strengthening of constitutional democracy in South Africa. The UN Human 
Rights Council recognized the importance of protecting these institutions from any 
reprisal or intimidation in a 2014 Resolution.118 The Resolution emphasized the need 
and importance of promptly bringing to justice those guilty of intimidating these 
institutions.119 In this regard, the Human Rights Council stated that:
[NHRIs] and their respective members and staff should not face any form of 
reprisal or intimidation, including political pressure, physical intimidation, 
harassment or unjustifiable budgetary limitations, as a result of activities 
undertaken in accordance with their respective mandates, including when 
taking up individual cases or when reporting on serious or systematic 
violations in their countries.120
116. Zibi, supra note 101, at 170.
117. 2011 (4) SA 420 (SCA) at para. 5.
118. Human Rights Council Res. 27/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/27/18, ¶ 9 (Oct. 7, 2014).
119. Id. ¶ 11. South Africa did not support the resolution. See Human Rights Council Res. 27/18, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/27/L.25 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter H.R.C. Res. 27/L.25].
120. H.R.C. Res. 27/L.25, supra note 119, ¶ 9. This came at the time when the Supreme Court of the 
Maldives had just brought legal proceedings against the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives 
for its submission on the country’s human rights assessment in the Universal Periodic Review process of 
the UN Human Rights Council. Interestingly, Lawrence Mushwana, in his capacity as the Chairperson 
of the ICC, wrote to the UN Secretary-General and others in protest against this conduct. E-mail from 
Mabedle Lourence Mushwana, ICC Chairperson, to Ban Ki-moon, UN Sec’y-Gen., Members of the 
Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council, and Special 
Rapporteurs (Sept. 25, 2014), http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/News/Documents/ICC%20Letter%20on%20
the%20situation%20of%20the%20HRC%20of%20the%20Maldives.pdf. Mushwana also wrote a 
letter, in 2015, to then-Prime Minister of Australia Tony Abbott in relation to attacks on the President 
of the Australian Human Rights Commission, Professor Gillian Triggs, following the release of the 
Commission’s report on human rights violations in Australia. E-mail from Mabedle Lourence 
Mushwana, ICC Chairperson, to Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia (Feb. 23, 2015), http://
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 C. Undermining the Effectiveness of Chapter 9 Institutions
 The failure to update the enabling laws for these institutions, the inadequate 
cooperation with the institutions, and the general disregard for their findings and 
recommendations by the state is another challenge facing Chapter 9 institutions that 
is designed to frustrate them and to render them ineffective. An example is the South 
African Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 (the “1994 HRC Act”).121 The 
1994 HRC Act was rendered outdated and even unconstitutional in some aspects by 
the adoption of the final Constitution.122 For example, the 1994 HRC Act made 
references to provisions of the Interim Constitution, which has been repealed by the 
final Constitution;123 required the Commission to submit quarterly reports to the 
President in violation of the final Constitution;124 and made no reference to the 
Commission’s mandate to monitor socioeconomic rights accorded to it by the final 
Constitution.125 It was finally repealed twenty years later, in 2014.126
 The Committee indicated that the staff regulations promulgated under the 1994 
HRC Act were outdated and created serious labor challenges for the SAHRC.127 On 
these challenges, the Committee “note[d] with concern that the delay in updating 
the [1994 HRC] Act and its associated regulations affects the ability of the 
Commission to carry out its mandate effectively and efficiently, and impacts 
negatively on its operational efficiency.”128
 The failure by the government to bring into full operation the promotional 
provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act 4 of 2000, especially section 28, which allows the SAHRC to prepare and 
publish reports on racism, gender, and disability issues,129 undermines the work of 
the SAHRC in effectively fighting racism and other forms of unfair discrimination 
in the country. This was supported by the Committee:
www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/the_prime_minister_of_australia.pdf. It is interesting that 
there is no record of any public media statement issued by Lawrence Mushwana or his fellow 
commissioners in support or defense of Thuli Madonsela as the Public Protector against attacks by 
ANC officials and supporters.
121. Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 (repealed 2014).
122. See ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 171–72. 
123. The preamble to the 1994 HRC Act specifically referenced sections 115 through 118 of the Interim 
Constitution. See also Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 § 3(1) (referring to section 115(1) of 
the Interim Constitution) (repealed 2014).
124. See Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994 § 15 (requiring the SAHRC to submit quarterly reports 
to the President). But cf. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(5) (requiring accountability and reporting by the 
SAHRC to the National Assembly).
125. See S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 184(3).
126. South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 § 24(1) (repealing Human Rights 
Commission Act 54 of 1994).
127. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 171.
128. Id. at 172.
129. See Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 § 28.
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The Committee finds it regrettable that six years after the [Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination] Act came into force, the 
regulations that would bring [section 28] into operation have yet to be 
promulgated. This delay adversely affects the [SAHRC’s] effectiveness in 
promoting the right to equality, which is central to the enjoyment of all other 
human rights in South Africa.130
 There is no clear reason or explanation for this failure by both the government 
and Parliament.131 The government has similarly failed to ratify key international 
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),132 and to discharge its reporting obligations 
pertaining to many regional and international human rights instruments the country 
has ratified. The ICESCR provides for many human rights that the SAHRC deals 
with,133 and its ratification would be of great assistance. The reporting obligation the 
ICESCR imposes on the state would assist the SAHRC’s effort to report on how 
socioeconomic rights are promoted and protected in South Africa.134
 The Public Protector and the SAHRC have both complained about the poor 
response by the government to their findings and recommendations.135 The response 
by President Zuma to the findings and recommendations against him in relation to 
his private home in Nkandla is behind many of the challenges and threats against 
the current Public Protector.136 How this matter is resolved will have a major impact 
on the future of both the Public Protector and the SAHRC.
130. ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 175.
131. Cf. SAHRC Equality Roundtable Report, supra note 31, at 13 (“A potential explanation . . . may be 
related to uncertainty as to whether government has the professional capacity and resources to fully 
meet its obligations to promote and monitor the implementation of the required legislation.”).
132. South Africa signed the ICESCR in 1994. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, signed Oct. 3, 1994, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
133. See id. art. 11 (recognizing a right to adequate food, clothing, and housing). 
134. See id. arts. 16–17. It should be noted that in 2015, the government decided to ratify the ICESCR. A 
few days after the ratification, the SAHRC called on the government to “expedite the domestication” of 
the ICESCR. Media Release, Isaac Mangena, Spokesperson, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, SAHRC 
Welcomes Government’s Decision to Ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkMenuID=91
&ipkArticleID=318.
135. For example, in one incident the Public Protector raised concerns about a Deputy Minister (now a 
Cabinet Minister) who did not respond to a request for information. See Pub. Protector S. Afr., 
Report on an Investigation into Allegations of the Misappropriation of Public Funds by 
the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. M.K.N. Gigaba MP: Report No. 34 of 2008/2009, 
at 20 (2009); see also Media Statement, Isaac Mangena, Spokesperson, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, 
SAHRC Finds Against Several Government Entities for Violating Public’s Right to Water and 
Sanitation (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkMenuID=91&ipkArticl
eID=253.
136. The President’s response was to the effect that his own Minster of Police would determine whether he 
should pay back any of the ZAR246 million in public funds spent on his private residence. See Sipho 
Kekana, Zuma Responds to Madonsela’s Letter, SABC News (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.sabc.co.za/
news/a/9f8e5580456f5e32afc2afc7c599c9eb/Zuma-responds-to-Madonsela’s-letter. 
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 D. Undermining Effectiveness Through Inadequate Funding
 The inadequate financial support for Chapter 9 institutions by the state, save for 
the IEC137 and the Auditor-General,138 hampers their effectiveness.139 This is despite 
repeated requests for adequate funding by both the Public Protector and the SAHRC 
over the past two decades, which the government has not responded to positively.140 
The Committee acknowledged that “financial independence is an important 
indicator of the independence of Chapter 9 and associated institutions.”141 The 
Committee recommended that the budgets of all Chapter 9 institutions be determined 
by Parliament and not the respective government departments which then determined 
their budgets.142
 On the importance of adequate funding for Chapter 9 institutions, the 
Constitutional Court, in New National Party of South Africa v. Government of the 
Republic of South Africa, said:
In dealing with the independence of the [IEC], it is necessary to make a 
distinction between two factors, both of which, in my view, are relevant to 
“independence”. The first is “financial independence”. This implies the ability 
to have access to funds reasonably required to enable the Commission to 
discharge the functions it is obliged to perform under the Constitution and 
the Electoral Commission Act. This does not mean that it can set its own 
budget. Parliament does that. What it does mean, however, is that Parliament 
must consider what is reasonably required by the Commission and deal with 
requests for funding rationally, in the light of other national interests. It is for 
Parliament, and not the executive arm of government, to provide for funding 
reasonably sufficient to enable the Commission to carry out its constitutional 
mandate. The Commission must accordingly be afforded an adequate 
opportunity to defend its budgetary requirements before Parliament or its 
relevant committees.143
The judgment has yet to be fully applied in favor of the SAHRC and the Public 
Protector.144
137. See ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 50.
138. See id. at 76.
139. See id. at 19–20.
140. See id. at 19.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 20.
143. 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) at para. 98.
144. See Emsie Ferreira, Separate Oversight for Chapter 9s: DA, IOL News (Apr. 30, 2015, 3:58 PM), http://
www.iol.co.za/news/politics/separate-oversight-for-chapter-9s-da-1.1852457; Fund Chapter Nines 
Independently: DA, IOL News (Oct. 22, 2014, 8:41 PM), http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/fund-
chapter-nines-independently-da-1.1769287#.VEiCXBZ9yAY; Thabo Mokone, Madonsela: No Funds, 
No Public Protector, Times Live (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2014/10/23/
madonsela-no-funds-no-public-protector.
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 There have been no significant improvements, however, since the Constitutional 
Court’s finding and the recommendation of the Committee. The Chairperson of the 
SAHRC, in the institution’s 2013 Annual Report, indicated that the SAHRC’s 
request for an additional ZAR37.35 million, supported by the Portfolio Committee 
on Justice and Constitutional Development, was ignored by the National Treasury, 
which only gave the SAHRC ZAR6 million.145 The Committee expressed concern 
over the location and process for funding of the Chapter 9 institutions.146 The Vote 
of the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development contains the budget 
allocations for the SAHRC, CGE, and the Public Protector.147 The Department, 
however, does not have the power to adjust the budget allocations.148 Rather, the 
Department acts “merely as a conduit for the transfer of monies to the relevant 
institutions.”149 Among the concerns preventing effective financial independence of 
the Chapter 9 institutions was the Committee’s finding that many of them “are not 
able to defend their budget submissions.”150
iV.  rECOMMEndatiOns: prOspECts fOr thE nEXt tWEntY YEars Of 
COnstitUtiOnaL dEMOCraCY
 The future and strength of South Africa’s constitutional democracy in the next 
twenty years will, to a large extent, depend on the role and impact of the Chapter 9 
institutions. It is important, therefore, that these institutions are supported and 
strengthened, and that the challenges they have faced over the past twenty years in 
relation to their independence, effectiveness, and funding are effectively addressed.
 A. Independence
 The independence of constitutional bodies, including their ability to operate 
impartially, is an important feature of an effective Chapter 9 institution and a 
hallmark of an independent and effective institution as per the Paris Principles. The 
appointment of persons closely linked to the government and governing party who 
are unable to take necessary action against key government or political figures as 
required, constitutes one of the biggest threats to the independence, credibility, and 
effectiveness of these institutions. The appointment of members of these institutions 
must thus be above board. Only suitable and competent persons should be appointed. 
 One way to limit undue politicization of the appointment of members in the 
Chapter 9 institutions is to allow for greater involvement of civil society in the 
appointment process. Whilst civil society organizations can nominate individuals to 
be considered for appointment as members of these institutions, they are not involved 
145. Mabedle Lawrence Mushwana, Foreword to SAHRC Annual Report 2013, supra note 69, at iv–v.
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in the assessment of the candidates and in making recommendations for their 
appointment—these are matters reserved to the National Assembly and its relevant 
committees.151
 The involvement of relevant experts outside the political parties in the shortlisting, 
interviewing, and recommendation of candidates for appointment to Chapter 9 
institutions would be of great benefit to the National Assembly and its relevant 
committees. It would minimize the politicization of the appointment process that 
has often led to the appointment of candidates that are not very independent in the 
exercise of their powers and would also enhance the credibility of the appointment 
process and the institutions themselves.
 This is not a far-fetched recommendation. The Constitution allows for the 
involvement of civil society in the recommendation process pertaining to the 
appointment of members of Chapter 9 institutions.152 This is in line with another 
provision of the Constitution, which requires the National Assembly to “facilitate 
public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly and its 
committees.”153 To date, however, the National Assembly has never invoked these 
provisions of the Constitution in the appointment process for members of Chapter 9 
institutions, and there has been no legal challenge in this regard.154
 If the National Assembly does not invoke these provisions of the Constitution, 
and there is no judicial intervention, an amendment to the Constitution regarding 
the appointment process may be another option. The Judicial Service Commission, 
which recommends suitable, fit, and proper persons to be appointed as judicial 
officers by the President in terms of the Constitution, provides a good model.155 The 
Judicial Service Commission consists of a mixture of judicial officers, practicing 
advocates and attorneys, members of the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, one law teacher, and persons designated by the President.156
 The threats and insults against Chapter 9 institutions by ANC supporters and 
senior members of government are unacceptable and a violation of the spirit and 
letter of the Constitution. This hostility places pressure on the independent status of 
the Chapter 9 institutions and negatively affects their ability to effectively carry out 
their mandates. Drastic measures must be taken by the state to put an end to this 
151. In accordance with section 193 of the Constitution, all members of Chapter 9 bodies are appointed by 
the President following a recommendation by the National Assembly. The recommendation of the 
National Assembly is based on nominations made by relevant committees of the National Assembly 
constituted by members of political parties in proportion to the number of seats they occupy in the 
Assembly. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 193(4)–(5). The process is generally politically charged, and political 
parties often nominate and recommend persons they favor. The public is allowed to nominate candidates, 
id. § 193(6), but does not take part in their shortlisting and interviewing, see ad hoc Committee 
Report, supra note 35, at 24 –25.
152. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 193(6). 
153. Id. § 59(1)(a).
154. However, such a case could be made on the basis of the obligatory provisions of the Constitution. Id. § 59.
155. Id. § 174.
156. Id. § 178(1).
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conduct, which is considered a criminal offense under the enabling laws of the 
SAHRC and the Public Protector.157 The leadership of all Chapter 9 institutions 
must also take this issue up with a greater sense of urgency.
 B. Effectiveness
 The appointment of suitable persons to these institutions and better responses to 
their findings and recommendations by the government would help to enhance their 
effectiveness and impact. Public Protector Thuli Madonsela’s service is a clear 
example of what a committed member of a Chapter 9 institution can achieve.
 Parliament, and the National Assembly and its relevant committees in particular, 
can play an important role in supporting these institutions by ensuring that the 
government and officials take the institutions’ findings and recommendations 
seriously and that their requests for information and reports from the government 
receive a satisfactory response.158 The leadership of Chapter 9 institutions should also 
show more courage in dealing with poor responses to the f indings and 
recommendations of their institutions by organs of state and should consider legal 
recourse where necessary and appropriate.
 With regard to the performances of members of Chapter 9 institutions, Parliament 
should hold Chapter 9 members accountable and demand that they carry out their 
mandates effectively and in accordance with constitutional provisions. This would help 
Chapter 9 institutions, such as the CGE, be more visible and effective.159 There is 
certainly no reason why Parliament should allow poor performance in these institutions.
 C. Funding
 Chapter 9 institutions have to be adequately funded, and both Parliament and the 
leadership of these institutions have to ensure that this happens. The leadership of 
Chapter 9 institutions should show more courage in this matter and explore all avenues 
to ensure adequate funding for their activities. One avenue is litigation if the government 
and other organs of state do not discharge their constitutional obligations to “ensure 
the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions.”160
157. Any person who “insult[s] the Public Protector or the Deputy Public Protector,” Public Protector Act 23 
of 1994 § 9(1), or “interferes with the functioning of the office of the Public Protector” commits a 
criminal offense, id. § 11(1). If convicted, the individual faces “a fine not exceeding [ZA]R40,000 or . . . 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or . . . both [the] fine and . . . imprisonment.” Id. § 
11(4). And under section 22 of the South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013, it is a 
criminal offense, punishable by a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months, for any person or organ 
of state to fail to provide the Commission with the assistance needed to carry out its functions and 
exercise its powers. South African Human Rights Commission Act 40 of 2013 § 22(h).
158. Parliament has a constitutional mandate to “maintain oversight of . . . the exercise of national executive 
authority, including the implementation of legislation; and . . . any organ of state.” S. Afr. Const., 
1996, § 55(2)(b).
159. See discussion supra Section II.D (reviewing the CGE’s effectiveness).
160. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 181(3).
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 D. Other Recommendations
 Civil society organizations and the media can also play a greater role in the 
activities of these institutions and in helping to ensure that they are effective and led 
by appropriate persons with strong leadership qualities. Greater media coverage of 
these institutions in terms of their successes, failures, and challenges would enhance 
public awareness, which could lead to necessary public pressure on the government 
to ensure that these institutions are adequately supported and protected. Public 
pressure is also necessary to ensure that these institutions discharge their mandates 
effectively. Additionally, the National Assembly should seriously consider the 
implementation of the Committee’s relevant outstanding recommendations, such as 
the merger of the CGE and the SAHRC.161
V. COnCLUsiOn
 While the Chapter 9 institutions have made an important contribution in 
supporting and strengthening constitutional democracy in South Africa, they cannot 
continue to do so effectively, and in a sustainable manner, without the support of the 
government, Parliament, political parties, and civil society. This support entails the 
appointment of suitable persons to run these institutions; adequate funding by the 
government; respect for the bodies’ activities; respect for and implementation of the 
bodies’ recommendations; non-interference in their appointment processes by 
political parties; and objective and constructive scrutiny of the operations of these 
institutions by all stakeholders, including civil society.
 The future of constitutional democracy in South Africa depends on the role of 
these institutions and on the support they receive from the government and civil 
society. The hostile reaction by the state and some members of the ruling party to 
these institutions, particularly to the Public Protector and the SAHRC, is of concern. 
The ANC government played a key role in the establishment of the Chapter 9 
institutions and in the allocation of millions of public funds for their continued 
operation. However, the government now seems to be turning against these 
institutions instead of embracing them and appreciating their role in strengthening 
constitutional democracy and ensuring that governance is accountable and responsive 
to the needs of the people.
 At the end of the day, these institutions are as strong and effective as the support 
they receive and the quality and courage of their leadership. Those appointed to 
serve in these institutions must do so without fear, favor, or prejudice and should act 
in the best interests of the people and the country’s f ledgling democracy. During the 
first two decades of the country’s constitutional democracy, the Public Protector and 
the SAHRC, respectively, have shown what can be achieved by these institutions 
when they are led by able and capable people, with courage and commitment to the 
advancement of human rights and constitutional democracy.
 Showing hostility toward these institutions when they make unfavorable findings, 
ignoring their findings, harassing them, and inadequately funding or supporting them 
161. See ad hoc Committee Report, supra note 35, at 37–40.
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is not in the best interest of the country and the strengthening of constitutional 
democracy. The current political, social, and economic challenges facing the country, 
such as high levels of crime;162 corruption;163 unemployment;164 increasing inequalities;165 
and poor delivery of public services such as health, housing, and education that leads to 
thousands of public protests, some accompanied by violence and destruction of public 
and private property,166 highlight the need for effective and efficient independent 
Chapter 9 institutions.
 The strength and quality of South Africa’s constitutional democracy will depend 
to a large extent on the effectiveness of many of its Chapter 9 institutions. The recent 
work of Public Protector Thuli Madonsela augurs well for the country’s future. Her 
efforts will hopefully inspire other Chapter 9 institutions that are not performing as 
well as her office in the second decade of South Africa’s democracy. One can only 
hope that there will be greater appreciation of these institutions in the next twenty 
years of South Africa’s democracy by the government, political parties, and civil 
society in general.
162. South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. See SA’s Murder Statistics in 7 Charts, IOL 
News (Oct. 6, 2015, 7:01 AM), http://beta.iol.co.za/news/sas-murder-statistics-in-7-charts-1925800; 
South Africa ‘A Country at War’ as Murder Rate Soars to Nearly 49 a Day, The Guardian (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/south-africa-a-country-at-war-as-rate-soars-to-
nearly-49-a-day. 
163. Lisa Steyn, South Africa: The Land Where the Corrupt Go Free, Mail & Guardian (Sept. 14, 2015), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-09-14-south-africa-the-land-where-the-corrupt-go-free.
164. Patrick McGroarty, South Africa Unemployment Hits 11-Year High, Wall St. J. (May 26, 2015, 3:01 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-africa-unemployment-hits-11-year-high-1432640795. 
165. See Gavin Keeton, Inequality in South Africa, NGO Pulse (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.ngopulse.org/
article/inequality-south-africa.
166. See Jane Duncan, The Politics of Counting Protests, Mail & Guardian (Apr. 17, 2014), http://mg.co.za/
article/2014-04-16-the-politics-of-counting-protests; see also Laura Grant, Taking to the Streets: Who is 
Protesting and Why?, Mail & Guardian (Apr. 28, 2014), http://mg.co.za/data/2014-04-28-taking-to-
the-streets-who-is-protesting-and-why.
